We present a structural model of¯rm growth, learning, and survival and consider its identi¯cation and estimation. In the model, entrepreneurs have private and possibly error-ridden observations of persistent and transitory shocks to pro¯t. We demonstrate that the model's parameters can be recovered from public observations of sales and survival, and we estimate them using monthly data from new bars in Texas. We¯nd that entrepreneurs observe pro¯t's persistent component without error. In this sense, their information is substantially superior to the public's.
Introduction
We present in this paper a structural model of¯rm growth, learning, and survival; and we consider its identi¯cation and estimation using a panel of Texas bars' monthly sales histories.
As in panel data commonly available from company directories or tax returns, these histories record each¯rm's sales from its birth until the end of the sampling period or its exit. In the model a¯rm's sales is a linear and increasing function of its pro¯t, but transitory shocks make it an imperfect indicator of pro¯t's persistent component. Entrepreneurs observe some of these shocks, so their forecasts of future pro¯t are necessarily superior to those of the public. Maximum likelihood estimation of the model's parameters measures the extent of entrepreneurs' Bayesian learning while accounting for their private information. We¯nd that the entrepreneurs in our sample observe pro¯t's persistent component without error. In this sense, their information is substantially superior to the public's.
Our analysis begins with an extension of Jovanovic's (1982) model of¯rm selection. The logarithm of each¯rm's pro¯t is the sum of three components, one that displays persistence and two others that are transitory. Unlike in Jovanovic's original model, the persistent component possibly changes through time. After the entrepreneur observes her pro¯t, she must decide either to remain open or to close the¯rm and avoid future¯xed costs. An entrepreneur only observes her pro¯t and one of its transitory components, and she bases her continuation decision on her posterior belief regarding the persistent component. We follow Jovanovic and assume that the components unobserved by the entrepreneur have normal distributions. Hence, the entrepreneur's posterior beliefs are also normal with a historydependent mean and an age-dependent variance. The¯rm exits when the posterior's mean falls below an age-speci¯c threshold. The data available to the econometrician are these continuation decisions' outcomes and the history of the¯rm's sales. The econometrician cannot predict the¯rm's future as well as the entrepreneur, because he observes neither of pro¯t's transitory components.
The characterization of entrepreneurs' private information using only their discrete continuation decisions and public sales data is not straightforward, because the information relevant for their continuation decisions is both hidden from the econometrician and persistent. The hidden state variable distinguishes our analysis from estimation procedures that use observations of a continuous forward-looking choice to infer a relevant state variable's value, as in Olley and Pakes (1996) . Our work also di®ers from structural dynamic discrete choice estimation that incorporates Rust's (1987) conditional-independence assumption, because the hidden state variable displays persistence even after conditioning on the entrepreneur's observed choice.
Although continuation decisions do not reveal the relevant state variable, the model's parameters can be recovered from¯rm histories such as those we observe. We show that di®erences between all¯rms' average sales and the average sales of those¯rms that subsequently survive reveals the distribution of the entrepreneurs' observations as well as the rules they use for their exit decisions. Heuristically, if these samples are very similar we conclude that most observed variation across¯rms re°ects shocks that the entrepreneur perceives to be irrelevant for the¯rm's future. This step only requires that the entrepreneur bases her decisions on her private information. It does not require the entrepreneur to form rational expectations or to make optimal decisions. The identi¯ed distributions and exit rules uniquely determine the parameters relevant for the entrepreneur's signal extraction problem.
Our data contain monthly records of the¯rst year in the lives of 305 new¯rms that operated a single bar in Texas. To calculate maximum likelihood estimates using this data, we augment the Kalman¯lter to account for sample selection. The resulting estimates measure the variances of the shocks that contaminate the entrepreneur's and econometrician's observations of pro¯t's persistent component. We¯nd that the entrepreneur observes this component without error.
Pakes and Ericson (1998) precede us in the empirical detection of Bayesian learning by entrepreneurs. One observable implication of Bayesian learning about a¯xed parameter is that a¯rm's initial size is useful for forecasting its size throughout its life. Pakes and Ericson formally develop this idea and nonparametrically test for such Bayesian learning by estimating the relevance of initial size in a¯rm size regression. With private entrepreneurial information a¯rm's initial size may improve the public's forecast even without entrepreneurial learning. We apply a test similar in spirit to Pakes and Ericson's to our sample of Texas bars and¯nd that initial size does indeed improve forecasts of¯rm sizes. However, the estimates of our structural model's parameters indicate that entrepreneurs' private information can account for this¯nding without reference to entrepreneurial learning.
Our estimates indicate that entrepreneurs face no signal extraction problem. However, a policy maker with access to only public information should use Bayesian updating to learn about a particular¯rm's pro¯t. Because our estimates directly characterize the informational di®erences between such a policy maker and an entrepreneur, they can serve as an important input into the evaluation of information-constrained policy interventions such as the taxation of entrepreneurship. We defer the analysis of such policies to future research.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data and some of its salient characteristics. Section 3 presents the structural model, and Sections 4 and 5 consider its identi¯cation and estimation. Section 6 presents and discusses our maximum likelihood estimates, and the¯nal section o®ers some concluding remarks.
Histories of Firm Growth and Survival
Readily available data sources| such as public tax records, business directories, or economic census records| allow the construction of data documenting the growth and survival of a cohort of entering¯rms. Gort and Klepper (1982) , Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) , Bahk and Gort (1992) , Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) , Holmes and Schmitz (1994) , and Pakes and Ericson (1998) have all examined such data sets and characterized their implications for various aspects of¯rm and industry growth. Our analysis uses a similar data set constructed from a panel of Texas alcohol tax returns. The state of Texas collects a 14% tax on the sale of alcohol for on-premise consumption, and the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (TABC) makes these returns publicly available. Returns are¯led monthly, and a¯rm must¯le a separate return for each of its establishments. Information included with each return includes the identity and street address of the establishment's parent¯rm, its trade name, its own street address, the date its alcohol license was issued, the date it was returned if the establishment no longer operates, and its tax payment for that month.
Sample Construction
Our observations begin in December, 1993 and end in March, 2001 . To account for in°a-tion over the sample period and persistent di®erences in input prices across locations, we divided all sales observations in our sample by the geometric average of tax returns from the establishment's county¯led in the same month. We used alcohol tax identi¯cation numbers and the establishments' street addresses to group these observations into establishment histories. Our linking process accounts for the fact that a single establishment may have multiple owners over its lifetime.
1 A tax return must be¯led for each establishment in every month, even if the establishment sold no alcohol for that month. Therefore, our data contain several reports of zero sales. The data also contain tax returns with a very low tax payment.
2 1 In our sample, there are numerous instances of an establishment being transferred from an individual to a corporate entity with the same address. These appear to be simply legal reorganizations with few immediate economic implications.
2 Some of these re°ect operation during only part of the¯rst or last month of the establishments' operation.
When the given dates of license issuance and return indicate that this is the case, we divide the tax payment
These apparently re°ect unobserved shutdown of the establishment for part of the month or a very small scale of operation. When constructing establishment histories, we equate any tax payment of less than $750 with zero. We consider an establishment to be born in thē rst month that it pays more than $750 in tax, and we date its exit in the¯rst month that it fails to pay that amount. If an establishment's tax payment temporarily falls below $750, we consider that establishment to have temporarily shut down. We exclude such establishments from our data set altogether.
Alcohol sales is of primary importance for bars, but restaurants substantially pro¯t from both alcohol and food sales. So that our sample is as homogeneous as possible in this regard, we focus only on those establishments that present themselves to the public as bars. To be included in our sample, a¯rm's trade name must include the word \bar" or one of 10 other words indicative of a drinking place, and it must not include the word \restaurant" or one of 20 words indicating the presence of substantial food service.
3 Given the limitations of the data, this minimizes the risk of falsely including restaurants at the expense of falsely excluding bars. There are also substantial di®erences between multiple establishment¯rms and their counterparts that only operate one location. The manager of an incumbent¯rm's new establishment can use that¯rm's history and experience to plan its operations and judge its prospects. An entrepreneur starting a single establishment¯rm has no such information to rely upon. Accordingly, we exclude any establishment founded by a¯rm with two or more establishments in Texas from our data set. There are 305 single-establishment¯rms in our data set that were born in the¯ve years beginning in 1994 and ending in 1999. These single establishment¯rms comprise our sample.
by the fraction of the month the establishment operated. Even after this correction, there remain several tax returns with very small but positive tax payments. The smallest positive tax payment in our data is under $1.
3 The words that qualify a¯rm for inclusion in the data set are \bar", \cantina", \cocktail", \drink", \lounge", \pub", \saloon", \tap", and \tavern." In addition to \restaurant" the words that exclude ā rm from our analysis are \bistro", \brasserie", \cafe", \club", \diner", \dining", \food", \grill", \grille", \hotel",`oyster", \restaurante", \shrimp", \steak", \steakhouse", \sushi", and \trattoria". When selecting this sample, we consider only the trade name listed on the¯rm's¯rst tax return that reports a tax payment greater than $750. Table 1 reports summary statistics from our sample of¯rms. For each age we consider, one to thirteen months old, it reports the number of¯rms that survived to that age; the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the logarithm of sales among these survivors; and the fraction of them that did not operate in the following month (the exit rate). Selection during these¯rms'¯rst year was extensive. Over the course of the year, 20% of the¯rms exited. The exit rates vary greatly over the course of the¯rst year. Exit rates near the end of the¯rm's¯rst year are relatively high, and no¯rms in our sample exited following their sixth and thirteenth months.
Summary Statistics
The lack of exits following the thirteenth month is particularly notable because it continues into the (unreported) fourteenth month. One possible explanation for this sudden and persistent decrease in exit is that the renewal of an annual lease on a commercial location is a watershed event that induces many unpro¯table businesses to exit after twelve months. In this case,¯rms that survived their¯rst year were relatively¯t and unlikely to have immediately exited.
Unsurprisingly, survivors' average size increases quickly with age. Initial average sales of all bars is slightly greater than the average sales of all license holders. After one year, the survivors' average size is approximately 27% greater than this overall average. The standard deviation of¯rms' initial sales is 0:87, and this cross-sectional standard deviation changes little over the¯rst year. The skewness of sales is very close to zero except in the eighth and tenth months, while the kurtosis varies between a high value of 3:53 in the¯rst month and a low value of 3:08 in the¯fth month. To better understand the statistical signi¯cance of these estimates, we have tabulated 95% bootstrap con¯dence intervals for all of the statistics in Table 1 . These (unreported) con¯dence intervals reveal that the skewness and kurtosis coe±cients are estimated much less precisely than the means and standard deviations. The average width of a con¯dence interval for a mean is 0:20, while the analogous average for the standard deviations' con¯dence intervals is 0:16. In contrast, the average widths of the skewness and kurtosis coe±cients' con¯dence intervals are 0:62 and 1:20.
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To assess the role of selection in the evolution of these summary statistics, it is helpful to inspect the analogous statistics from those¯rms that survived the entire sample period. Table  2 reports these statistics for the 244¯rms that operated for thirteen or more months. There are no striking di®erences between the selected sample's second and higher moments and those of the complete sample. However, the means of the selected sample are considerably higher than their analogues from the complete sample. The average log sales in the¯rst month of a¯rm that survives its¯rst year is eleven percentage points higher than the unconditional average, 0:17 versus 0:06. Thus, selection and the growth of surviving¯rms each account for approximately one half of the complete sample's mean growth.
Firm Growth
As in many other panels of¯rm histories, entrepreneurs' exit decisions clearly contribute to the evolution of our sample. To better understand the importance of entrepreneurial learning for this selection and other forward-looking decisions, Pakes and Ericson (1998) advocate examining the persistence of surviving¯rms' sales. In particular, they derive robust predictions from two models of learning. In the model of passive learning, entrepreneurs apply Bayesian updating to learn about a time-invariant and¯rm-speci¯c parameter, as in Jovanovic (1982) . This model implies that a¯rm's initial sales will be useful for forecasting its sales throughout its life. In the active learning model,¯rms invest to improve their products and processes. Because the outcome of this investment is stochastic and very successful¯rms optimally choose to invest little and allow their knowledge to depreciate, ā rm's initial sales becomes progressively less relevant for forecasting its future as it ages.
Pakes and Ericson test these models' contrasting predictions using panels of Wisconsin retail and manufacturing¯rms. They¯nd that initial sales improves forecasts of retailers' future sales, but manufacturers' future sales appear to be Markovian. From this, they conclude that an approach to¯rm dynamics based on Bayesian learning is promising for retail¯rms. We have assessed the properties of our sample of bars by conducting a similar empirical investigation. For each month of the life cycle that we consider, we have nonparametrically characterized the regression of the logarithm of a¯rm's sales on the logarithms of its sales in the previous and¯rst months. For this we estimated density-weighted average derivatives of the regression functions using Powell, Stock, and Stoker's (1989) nonparametric instrumentalvariables estimator.
5 These estimates rely on no distributional assumptions beyond standard regularity conditions, so they are appropriate for investigating the importance of a¯rm's initial sales on its evolution when the structural parameters relevant for the survival decision are unknown.
5 To implement this estimation, we follow Powell, Stock, and Stoker's (1998) recommendation and use the bias-reducing kernel discussed by Bierens (1987) . Before estimation, we scaled both explanatory variables by their standard deviations. We used a tenth-order kernel with a bandwidth of 2. Table 3 reports these estimates as well as standard errors based on their Gaussian asymptotic distributions. All of the derivative estimates are positive and statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level. The derivatives with respect to the previous month's sales are surprisingly similar across months. They are nearly all between 0:80 and 0:95. The derivatives with respect to the¯rm's sales in its¯rst month are smaller but not negligible. Furthermore, there is no apparent tendency for the¯rm's initial sales to become less relevant for forecasting as thē rm ages. When the dependent variable is the¯rm's sales in the third month, the derivative with respect to the¯rst month's sales equals 0.154. This is nearly identical to the analogous coe±cient when the dependent variable is the thirteenth month's sales, 0.168. The analogous coe±cients in the other months vary from a low estimate of 0:021 to a high of 0:190. Overall, the estimates indicate that no low-order Markov process can¯t surviving¯rms' observed sales well. Expanding the set of regressors to include the past three months' sales attenuates the estimated e®ect of the¯rst month's sales, but does not alter this conclusion.
Pakes and Ericson (1998) emphasize that the observable di®erences between the two models they consider only apply to very old¯rms if sales depend on transitory shocks observed by only the entrepreneur. Thus, any conclusion about the importance of Bayesian learning based on the application of their methodology to our sample of new¯rms is necessarily suspect. The structural analysis we will pursue next overcomes this di±culty by using entrepreneurs' observed continuation decisions to measure the variation in sales due to those transitory shocks that the entrepreneur observes.
A Structural Model of Firm Growth and Survival
In this section, we present a structural model of¯rm growth and survival in a monopolistically competitive industry. We assume that potential entrants are ex ante identical and that¯rms only compete anonymously ex post. That is, the behavior of any single¯rm only possibly depends on the behavior of other¯rms through some aggregate statistics. There is no direct strategic interaction between any two¯rms. We¯rst discuss this assumption's content and empirical plausibility. We then detail the¯rm's stochastic environment and optimization problem. Finally, we consider the entrepreneur's procedure for optimally assessing her¯rm's future and deciding upon its survival.
Imperfect Competition and Firm Dynamics
Bars produce heterogeneous goods and compete with each other in local markets. This compels us to consider imperfect competition as the most likely market structure for our sample of¯rms. The theory of competition among a large number of producers o®ers us two distinct approaches to consider, monopolistic and oligopolistic competition.
In models of monopolistic competition such as Dixit and Stiglitz's (1977) , Hart's (1985) , and Wolinsky's (1986), producers compete anonymously, and strategic interaction is absent.
These models inherit the simplicity of perfect competition. The actions of any single producer are irrelevant for any competitor's pro¯ts. This irrelevance immediately implies that idiosyncratic shocks to demand and cost have no e®ect on competitors' pro¯ts or optimal actions. Therefore, the empirical analysis of a monopolistic competition model can proceed by considering each producer's choice problem in isolation from those of her rivals after conditioning on the appropriate aggregate variables.
In contrast, models of oligopolistic competition, such as Prescott and Visscher's (1977) and Salop's (1979) , emphasize strategic interaction. A producer's actions impact the pro¯ts of her neighbors in geographic or product space, so shocks that directly in°uence only one producer's pro¯ts can a®ect her competitors indirectly. The presence of these indirect e®ects complicates these models' empirical analysis.
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Campbell and Hopenhayn (2002) suggest a simple procedure for distinguishing between these two approaches to imperfect competition based on cross-market comparisons of the producer size distribution. A robust prediction of anonymous monopolistic competition is that the producer size distribution is invariant to market size if factor prices, demographics, and technology are held constant.
7 This prediction follows directly from the the failure of entry to erode monopolistic competitors' market power. In contrast, models of oligopolistic competition generally predict that producers in large and competitive markets recover their¯xed costs by selling more at a lower markup than their counterparts in small and less competitive markets. Thus, a comparison of average producer size across large and small markets can 6 The observation that consumers view similar goods available at di®erent geographic locations as imperfect substitutes does not immediately imply that competition is oligopolistically competitive. Campbell and Lapham (2001) illustrate this with a model of monopolistic competition and cross-border shopping. Although competition is anonymous in that model, goods produced in the same location are better substitutes than are goods produced in di®erent locations. 7 Campbell (2002) demonstrates that this familiar feature of symmetric monopolistic competition models with free entry and a single technology is robust to introducing product placement and technology choice decisions of arbitrary complexity.
determine which of these two approaches to competition among large numbers of producers is more empirically promising. We have implemented Campbell and Hopenhayn's procedure for our bars' parent four-digit industry, Drinking Places, using exactly the same sample of markets, control variables, measures of market size, and measures of establishment size that they do. Unlike in the majority of industries that Campbell and Hopenhayn consider, we fail to¯nd a statistically signi¯cant e®ect of market size on average establishment size in Drinking Places. In most of the speci¯cations we have considered, the estimated coe±cient on market size is negative and statistically insigni¯cant. This cross-market comparison of establishment sizes does not refute the assumption that bars are monopolistic competitors. The remainder of our analysis rests accordingly on the assumption of monopolistic competition.
The Stochastic Environment
Consider the life of a single¯rm, which begins production at time t = 1. The¯rm is a monopolistic competitor that produces a single good at a single location. Idiosyncratic shocks cause the demand curve for the¯rm's product to vary over time. In period t, it is Q t = e X t +W t P ¡"
t , where " > 1 is the absolute value of the¯rm's demand elasticity and P t is its price. The composite random variable X t + W t shifts the demand curve's location through time, and we explain the properties of its two components below. Throughout, we adopt conventional notation and reserve capital letters for random variables and small letters for their realizations.
An a±ne cost function, # ¢ Q t + · t , describes the¯rm's technology, with both # and · t strictly greater than zero. In our application to Texas' bars, time variation in the¯xed cost · t may re°ect the fact noted in Section 2 that leases on bars typically have¯xed terms. It is straightforward to show that the entrepreneur's pro¯t-maximizing price choice is constant,
The resulting sales and pro¯ts are
and
We choose the unit of account to set # = (" ¡ 1)=", so that log sales are simply S t = X t + W t and the¯rm's pro¯t equals " ¡1 e St ¡ · t .
The random variables W t and X t represent the transitory and persistent components of the¯rm's pro¯t. The transitory component is independent through time and continuously distributed with density f Wt in period t. We assume that this random variable has mean zero, but currently we leave its distribution otherwise unspeci¯ed. The persistent component follows a Gaussian linear state-space model with parameters that (potentially) depend on the¯rm's age. That is
In (3), ½ 1´0 and ½ t > 0 for all t > 1, so that A t and X t are positively autocorrelated. The disturbance processes fZ t g and fU t g are independent over time and mutually independent of each other. The intercept ¹ t re°ects systematic¯rm growth as the¯rm ages, such as that arising from passive learning about the production process. For concreteness, we have assumed that variation in the¯rm's pro¯t re°ects only demand shocks and that the¯rm's marginal cost is constant. We could alternatively have assumed that demand is constant and marginal cost is stochastic, or that both are stochastic. If we only have data on sales and survival, all of these models are observationally equivalent. In this paper, we restrict attention to the analysis of such data and we do not address the separate identi¯cation of idiosyncratic demand and cost shocks. If we also observed¯rms' price choices, the assumption of a constant percentage markup would allow us to identify separate shocks to demand and marginal cost.
Bayesian learning and selection
We assume that the entrepreneur observes W t and X t separately at the beginning of period t, but she observes neither A t nor U t . At the end of each period, the entrepreneur must decide whether or not to close the¯rm and exit. Exit is an irreversible decision, and its payo® equals zero. The entrepreneur is risk-neutral and discounts the¯rm's future pro¯ts with the constant factor ± < 1.
The normality of Z t and U t imply that the entrepreneur can use the Kalman¯lter to calculate an optimal inference of A t given the information at hand, (X 1 ; : : : ; X t )´¹ X t . Denote this optimal forecast and its mean squared error witĥ
The Kalman¯lter calculatesÂ t and § t recursively usinĝ
and § t =´2 t¸t ;
The initialization of (7) uses § 0 = 0. The coe±cient¸t is the Kalman gain, and it measures the informativeness of the entrepreneurs' observation of X t . The¯rm's sales re°ects both X t and W t , so the entrepreneur's inference of A t is necessarily superior to that of an econometrician using only the current and past realizations of S t .
Although the entire history of X t is in principle relevant for the entrepreneur's exit decision,Â t and the¯rm's age are su±cient for characterizing the distribution of future pro¯ts given the information in ¹ X t . De¯ne v t ³Â t ; S t´t o be the value of a¯rm of age t to an entrepreneur who estimates A t to beÂ t and observes current sales to be S t . The Bellman equation that this value function satis¯es is
The entrepreneur calculates the expectation E t in (8) using the joint distribution ofÂ t+1 and S t+1 conditional on the available information at time t, for which (t;Â t ) is su±cient. The owner's optimal exit policy is simple. The expectation in the right-hand side of (8) is a function of (t;Â t ) and it is continuous and increasing inÂ t . Therefore, there exists a threshold value ® t such that the owner chooses to exit if and only ifÂ t · ® t . De¯ne N t to be an indicator variable that equals one if the¯rm has survived through that date and equals zero otherwise. Given the exit rule, this is generated recursively by
This speci¯cation of our model assumes that the market is in a stationary equilibrium, as in Hopenhayn (1992) , so that aggregate disturbances change neither the¯rm's demand nor its cost structure. This assumption is undesirable if aggregate shocks are important for the industry under consideration. However, it is straightforward to generalize the model to allow the evolution of the sales process and the chosen exit policy to depend on aggregate statistics such as the number of producers per customer.
Identi¯cation
Suppose an econometrician observes a set of¯rms from our model for T periods. On each date, the econometrician records both S t and N t . For completeness, we de¯ne S t = 0 if N t = 0. At the end of period T , the econometrician also records N T+1 . That is, the¯rms' survival at the end of the sample period is known. In this section, we investigate which of the parameters of our structural model can be recovered from the joint distribution of these observations.
In our model, the exit thresholds (® 1 ; : : : ; ® T )´¹ ® T represent the entrepreneur's optimal exit decisions. Unlike Rust's (1987) nested¯xed-point algorithm, our approach to identi¯-cation and estimation does not rely on an explicit solution to the entrepreneur's dynamic programming problem. Rather, we treat these thresholds as parameters to be estimated jointly with parameters that determine the evolution of
T and 1 2 T , and the unknown densities (f W1 ; : : : ; f W T ). The statistical problem we face is to identify and estimate the true values of these parameters and functions using the realizations of ( ¹ S T ; ¹ N T+1 ) from a large cross-section of¯rms. We do not identify or estimate the parameters that in°uence the observable data only through the choice of ¹ ® T . These are ±, ", and ¹ · T . We begin by placing our model into a less restrictive encompassing model in which neither the latent variable A t nor the entrepreneur's Bayesian learning play an explicit role in the evolution of X t , S t , and N t . Rust (1994) refers to such a model that directly characterizes dynamic decisions without reference to the parameters of technology or preferences as a reduced-form model, and we adopt this terminology here. We¯rst show that the parameters of the reduced-form model are identi¯ed. Then, we prove that these parameters can be used to recover all of our structural model's parameters except ¹ 1 , ® 1 , ¾ 2 1 ,´2 1 , ¾ 2 , and ½ 2 . The identi¯cation of these remaining parameters requires one additional restriction. This sequential approach to identi¯cation broadens the applicability of our results beyond the speci¯c structural model we consider.
A Reduced-Form Model of Survival and Growth
Our structural model can be viewed as a special case of a less restrictive model of¯rm growth and survival in which (3) and (4) are replaced by a sequence of age-speci¯c regression functions,
for t = 1; : : : ; T . The expectational error V t is normally distributed with mean zero and variance ! 2 t ( ¹ X t¡1 ) conditional on ¹ X t¡1 .¯t and ! t are arbitrary (measurable) functions of ¹ X t¡1 . The¯rm has no history at t = 1, so¯1 and ! 1 are simply constant parameters. The entrepreneur's exit rule also makes no reference to A t or Bayesian learning. Instead, the entrepreneur closes the¯rm if and only if X t falls below a history-dependent threshold, ¿ t ¡ ¹ X t¡1 ¢ . Again, ¿ t is an arbitrary (measurable) function of ¹ X t¡1 and ¿ 1 is simply a constant parameter. The recursive rule determining N t in this case is
The model given by (10), (11), and
encompasses the structural model. For given values of the structural model's parameters, there are unique choices of¯t, ! 2 t and ¿ t that yield the same distribution of ( ¹ S T ; ¹ N T+1 ; ¹ X T ). In particular, equations (3) and (4) imply that¯t( ¹ X t¡1 ) = ¹ t + ½ tÂt¡1 , so that we can build the regression functions¯t recursively using (5), (6), and (7). The regression error V t is simply
Finally, the exit threshold that is consistent with the structural model's exit rule is
Because its parameters display general history dependence, the reduced form model's identi¯cation demonstrates that structural models of¯rm growth and survival other than our own also have empirical content. In particular, the heteroskedasticity of the errors in the state-evolution equation (10) allows the volatility of¯rms' pro¯ts to depend on the resolution of a pro¯t-relevant event, such as acquiring a stable clientele. Such modi¯cations to our relatively simple structural model may be relevant for considering other aspects of the life cycle in other industries, and we defer their exploration to future research.
Identi¯cation of the Reduced Form Model
Identi¯cation of the reduced form model requires deconvolution of the observed sales process fS t g into the two components observed by the entrepreneur, fX t g and fW t g. To achieve identi¯cation, we use sample selection to partially solve the deconvolution problem. Because the entrepreneur's continuation decisions only depend on fX t g, we can disentangle fX t g and fW t g by comparing the unconditional distribution of S t with its distribution conditional on N t+1 = 1. Our solution is partial in the sense that we identify¯t such that N t = 1 for t = 1; : : : ; T .
Proof. The proof proceeds recursively. It is helpful to de¯neS t andÑ t+1 to be the random vectors (S t ; : : : ; S T ) and (N t+1 ; : : : ; N T+1 ). Denote their joint density with ¹ X t¡1 by fS t ;Ñt+1; ¹ Xt¡1 (¢). We begin with the assumption that the econometrician knows this joint density for a particular age t. For t = 1, fS 1 ;Ñ 2 ; ¹ X 0 (¢) is simply the joint density of the econometrician's data. We¯rst show that¯t, ! 2 t , ¿ t and f Wt can be recovered from fS
We then demonstrate that these parameters in turn identify fS t+ 1 ;Ñ t+2 ; ¹ X t (¢) if t < T , allowing the recursion to continue.
We begin with the identi¯cation of¯t
¢ for some value of ¹ X t¡1 such that N t = 1. This requires only the knowledge of the expected value of S t conditional on this history, the conditional probability of survival, and the expected value of S t given this history and survival to period t + 1. These are
here ©(¢) and Á(¢) and the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of a standard normal random variable. Because the joint distribution of (S t ; N t+1 ) conditional on the given history is assumed to be known, these three equations immediately yield¯t
note that the probability density of S t conditional on the given history can be written as
All components of (17) except f W t are known, so applying a standard deconvolution argument establishes that f W t is identi¯ed.
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We will now show that fS t+ 1;Ñt+ 2; ¹ Xt (¢) is identi¯ed. The independence of W t fromW t+1 and ¹ X T implies that the joint distribution of W t and X t conditional upon ³ ¹ X t¡1 ;S t+1 ;Ñ t+1d isplays independence. Therefore, the probability density of S t conditional on these variables is
As in (17), ¹ X t¡1 is assumed to imply that N t = 1. The left-hand side of (18) and f Wt are known, so deconvolution yields f Xt ³ ¢j ¹ X t¡1 ;S t+1 ;Ñ t+1´. For any value of X t such that ¹ X t´¡ X t ; ¹ X t¡1 ¢ implies that N t+1 = 1, we can immediately recover the joint distribution of interest by multiplying this conditional distribution by the known joint distribution of the conditioning variables. Thus, the recursion may continue. Equation (16) directly parallels Heckman's (1979) decomposition of the regression function of a selected sample into the unconditional regression function and the expectation of the error conditional upon selection. As in his model, the choice probability in (15) immediately identi¯es the inverse of Mill's ratio in (16), but without imposing further parametric restrictions on¯t( ¹ X t¡1 ) and ! t ( ¹ X t¡1 ), the resulting equation does not uniquely determine the model's parameters. However, because we observe the unselected sample, the identi¯cation of¯t( ¹ X t¡1 ) is immediate using (14). With this additional information, the identi¯cation of
Our analysis is also related to Blundell and Preston's (1998) identi¯cation of a consumer's permanent income process using the covariance of his current income (a noisy proxy) with his consumption (a forward-looking choice). To see this, rewrite equation (16) using (14) and (15) as
This equation immediately yields !( ¹ X t ) from the observed covariance of S t with N t . As the covariance approaches zero for a given survival probability, so does the inferred value of !( ¹ X t ). Thus, if current size is very helpful at forecasting survival in a linear probability model, we infer that much of the observed variance of S t re°ects persistent shocks. Otherwise, we infer that transitory shocks without dynamic implications for the entrepreneur dominate variation in S t .
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Identi¯cation of the Structural Model
Proposition 1 shows that identi¯cation of ¹ X T 's distribution and the¯rm's exit policy relies on only on the assumption that fX t g follows some (possibly non-linear, higher-order, and heteroskedastic) auto-regression with normal disturbances and that the entrepreneur uses some history-dependent threshold-based exit rule. We now turn to the implications of Proposition 1 for our particular structural model. If we assume that entrepreneurial learning is absent from our framework, then the identi¯cation of the structural model's remaining parameters is immediate. The following proposition asserts that the addition of entrepreneurial learning imposes no fundamental obstacle to identi¯cation.
Proposition 2. Given the functions¯t, ! t , ¿ t for t = 1; : : : ; T , the following parameters of the structural model are uniquely determined: ¹ 1 ; ¹ 3 ; : : : ; ¹ T ; ¾ Proposition 2 can be easily proven using the choices of¯t, ! t , and ¿ t that are consistent with the structural model. The proof is available from the authors upon request. The intuition behind this result is straightforward: if entrepreneurial learning is unimportant, then t ( ¹ X t¡1 ) will depend only on X t¡1 and ¿ t ( ¹ X t¡1 ) will be a constant. With entrepreneurial learning, both of these functions depend in general on the entire history ¹ X t¡1 . Therefore, it is possible to use these functions' history dependence to infer the presence and magnitude of entrepreneurial learning. Because the lag structure plays a crucial role here, Proposition 2 does not deliver full identi¯cation of the structural model. In particular, there may be multiple ways of decomposing X 1 into the persistent component unobserved by the entrepreneur, A 1 , and the noise that masks it, U 1 . However, this lack of identi¯cation can be addressed with a single additional restriction. In all of our empirical speci¯cations, we will impose the assumption that ½ 2 = ½ 3 = : : : = ½ T , which is more than su±cient to guarantee identi¯cation of all the structural model's parameters. 
Discussion
Before proceeding to the estimation of our model, we wish to consider brie°y our identi¯ca-tion result from the perspective of the extensive literature on the identi¯cation of discrete choice models. A key aspect of our analysis is that entrepreneurs base their decisions on information that is unavailable to the econometrician. This is embodied in our model by the assumption that the econometrician only observes a noisy signal, S t , of the relevant state variable, X t . As such, our discrete-choice problem involves an error that is independent of the latent variable that determines the entrepreneur's choice. Therefore, we cannot directly apply non-parametric identi¯cation results for static binary-choice models involving an error that is independent of the observed covariates, such as some of Manski's (1988) results. The discrepancy between private and public information in our model furthermore implies a violation of Rust's (1987) conditional-independence assumption. Taber (2000) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002) have studied the identi¯ability of dynamic discrete-choice models without this assumption. Our identi¯cation result di®ers from theirs, because we observe no state variable.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The proof of Proposition 1 is constructive, so it immediately suggests a semi-parametric estimator for our model built on the empirical analogues of (14), (15), and (16). Forming these moment conditions requires repeated deconvolution applied to the joint density of ( ¹ S T ; ¹ N T+1 ). Rather than pursuing this semi-parametric approach, we consider instead parametric maximum likelihood estimation. To this end, we assume that W t is normally distributed with mean zero and variance°2 t . Maximum likelihood estimation poses no conceptual problems, but computation of the likelihood is nontrivial because the model involves repeated selection on the basis of a persistent latent state variable.
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The structural model also implies several cross-equation restrictions that allow one to test the hypotheses that (i) the persistence in X t re°ects the evolution of a single latent factor and (ii) entrepreneur's exit decisions are based on a rational assessment of this latent factor. We will explore these cross-equation restrictions in future work.
In the following, we suppose that the structural model's parameters are themselves known functions of a vector of \primitive" parameters, $. Our method of calculating the likelihood function follows the non-Gaussian state-space model approach of Kitagawa (1987) , which utilizes the likelihood's prediction-error decomposition
where Y t´( S t ; N t ) unless t = T + 1, in which case it equals N T+1 . In (19), we have explicitly included the vector of primitive parameters to be estimated as an argument. Consider the¯rst term in (19), the density of Y 1 . Because N 1 = 1 always, this is simply
where
t is the variance de¯ned in the analysis of the reduced form model. Our recursive procedure for computing the likelihood's remaining terms is based on initializing and updating the density of b
To recursively calculate the likelihood function's remaining terms, suppose that for a given t¸2, the conditional density f b At¡1 ¡â t¡1 j ¹ Y t¡1 ; $ ¢ is known. We consider three separate cases. If the¯rm exits production following period t ¡ 1, then N t = 0 and the relevant term in the likelihood function is the probability of exit conditional on the observed history.
Following exit, the evolution of S t is trivial and the remaining terms in the prediction error decomposition identically equal one. In the second case, the¯rm continues production following period t ¡ 1, but t = T + 1 so the data do not contain the realized value of S t . In this case of right censoring, the¯nal term in the prediction error decomposition is
In the¯nal case, the¯rm produces in period t < T + 1, so N t = 1. For this case, the term of interest in the likelihood function can be written as
Equation (23) follows from Bayes' rule and the de¯nition of b A t¡1 .
This¯nal case is the only one in which we wish to continue the recursion. To do so, we must calculate f b
The distribution of ³ b A t ; S t´c onditional on b A t¡1 is bivariate normal, so both terms in the integrand of (24) are known. Therefore, the recursion can continue.
Iterating on (23) and (24) until the individual either exits or is right censored produces the likelihood function at any given choice of $. In practice, evaluating the likelihood function requires approximating the integrals in (21), (22), (23), and (24). We do so using a Gaussian quadrature procedure.
Empirical Results
We now turn to maximum likelihood estimation of our model's parameters using the TABC panel. We begin with a relatively simple model based on Hopenhayn's (1992) industry dynamics model. In this model, the entrepreneur faces no signal extraction problem becausé 2 t = 0 and W t has an age-invariant normal distribution with variance°2. Furthermore, the evolution of A t does not directly depend on the¯rm's age because ¹ t , ½ t , and ¾ 2 t equal the constants ¹, ½, and ¾ 2 for t¸2: If the¯xed production cost does not vary with age, then the optimal exit policy in such a stationary environment is itself stationary. We impose this by constraining ® t for all t to equal the constant ®. We refer to this below as the model's stationary speci¯cation. After considering these estimates, we turn to a nonstationary speci¯cation in which ¹ t and ® t are both allowed to be arbitrary functions of t. Finally, we further generalize the nonstationary speci¯cation by introducing entrepreneurial learning. To do so, we assume that´2 t equals a possibly nonzero constant,´2, for all t. This section then concludes with a brief summary of our results. Table 4 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of our model's stationary speci¯cation using the sample of 305 new bars described in Section 2. Below each estimate is its asymptotic standard error, which we calculated using the outer product estimate of the information matrix. First, consider the estimates of ¹ 1 , ¾ 1 , and°, which jointly determine the distribution of¯rms' initial sizes. The estimate of ¹ 1 , 0:109, is somewhat higher than the unconditional mean of¯rms' initial size reported in Table 1 , 0:06. However, the standard error attached to this estimate is relatively large, 0:055. The estimates of ¾ 1 and°1, 0:766 and 0:294, together imply that the standard deviation of S 1 equals 0:82, which di®ers little from the estimated standard deviation of 0:87. At these parameter estimates, the transitory shock W 1 accounts for approximately 13% of the variance of S 1 . The remainder is attributable to the persistent shock X 1 . The estimate of ® equals ¡1:23, implying that the probability of a¯rm exiting after just one month of operation is 0:04. This is substantially higher than the exit rate we observe in the TABC sample. Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 4 is the estimated value of ½, which is exactly one. That is, the persistent component of pro¯tability in the model follows a random walk. This is estimated with great precision | its standard error equals 0.006. With this estimate of ½ the intercept ¹ becomes the drift in the random walk of A t . This estimate is negative, ¡0:017 and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The innovation to this random walk has a standard deviation of ¾, which we estimate to equal 0:187. Together, the estimated negative drift and substantial innovation variance imply that the expected growth rate of the persistent component's level, E[e ¢At ¡ 1] is slightly above zero. Given the estimates of ¾ and°, we can calculate the variance of the change in S t , ¾ 2 + 2°2. The associated standard deviation equals 0:46. Variation in W t accounts for just over 80% of this variance.
Stationary Speci¯cation
To help gauge how well the estimated model¯ts the data, Table 5 reports the population values of the summary statistics we considered above in Section 2.
12 As we noted above, the exit rate for new¯rms in the model is much higher than its empirical analogue. Similarly, the model's exit rates for¯rms nine to twelve months old are lower than those we estimate. Overall, the model with a stationary exit threshold¯ts the observed exit rates poorly. As in the data, selection drives growth in the average size of survivors, and it has little impact on the standard deviation of their sizes. As expected, selection increases the cohort's skewness as it ages. The cohort's kurtosis initially falls with selection and then gradually increases. Recall from Section 2 that these latter two moments are very imprecisely estimated, so the di®erences between the model's predictions of skewness and kurtosis and their sample counterparts does not indicate a poor¯t between the model and the data.
Nonstationary Speci¯cation
The discrepancy between the very low frequency of exit among brand-new entrants and the relatively high rate predicted by the estimated stationary speci¯cation suggests that the model's¯t could be improved by allowing either the evolution of A t or the exit policy to depend on t. The nonstationary speci¯cation allows for both of these sources of age dependence. Table 6 contains the maximum likelihood estimates of its parameters, and Table 7 presents the estimated speci¯cation's summary statistics. The estimates of those parameters that are common to the two speci¯cations, ¹ 1 , ¾ 1 , ¾, ½, and°, are very close to the analogous estimates in Table 4 . In particular, the estimate of ½, 0:992, is statistically indistinguishable from one. Next, consider the estimates of the age-speci¯c intercepts, ¹ 2 ; : : : ; ¹ 12 . These are measured relatively imprecisely, but the tendency for them to be negative is clear: only three of the eleven estimates are positive. Overall, these estimates reveal no substantial tendency for a¯rm's growth to accelerate or decelerate as it ages. The¯nal parameters to report are those describing the entrepreneurs' exit policy, ¹ ® 12 . Unlike with the estimated intercepts, these are clearly not constant. The estimate of the initial exit threshold is ¡1:94. This is estimated imprecisely, as the relatively little exit following the¯rst month leads us to expect. Nevertheless, it is substantially below the estimated exit threshold from the stationary speci¯cation. The implied probability that ā rm exits following its¯rst month, 0:008, is much closer to that we observe. As the¯rm ages, the estimated exit thresholds tend to rise. Although this increase is not uniform over time, its e®ects are clear. The estimate of ® 2 is ¡1:53, while that for ® 12 is ¡0:97. These are both relatively precisely estimated. The only remaining exit threshold that we estimate imprecisely is ® 6 . This is unsurprising, given the fact that no¯rm in our sample exits immediately following its sixth month of operation. Overall, allowing ® t to vary with thē rm's age signi¯cantly improves the model's¯t with the data. 13 A comparison of the model's summary statistics with those of the data reinforces this impression. As in the data, the exit rate from the model is initially low and then gradually rises through the cohort's¯rst year. Similarly, the growth of surviving¯rms' average size matches that from the data reasonably well.
13 To formally gauge this improvement, we have calculated a likelihood ratio statistic of the hypothesis that that the values of ¹ t are unconstrained and ® t = ® for all t relative to the alternative hypothesis embodied in the nonstationary speci¯cation. The likelihood ratio test statistic equals 236:09, which exceeds all conventional critical values for a Â 2 random variable with 11 degrees of freedom.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of´2
We now turn to the estimation of´2, which determines the speed and extent of entrepreneurial learning. Figure 1 summarizes our results. For values of´2 between zero and 0:07, it plots the value of the likelihood function after enveloping out the nonstationary speci¯cation's other parameters. The result is clear: the likelihood function attains its maximum at´2 = 0. That is, our maximum likelihood estimates imply that entrepreneurs observe the persistent component of pro¯t without error. We have conducted the same exercise for several alternative speci¯cations of our model, and they have all yielded this result. Thus, we¯nd no evidence that entrepreneurial learning contributes to the dynamics of the¯rms in this sample.
Summary of Results
Four results summarize our estimates. First, pro¯t's persistent component follows a random walk. Thus, a version of Gibrat's law characterizes our young and small¯rms. Second, the variance of¯rms' growth rates is dominated by transitory shocks. In both speci¯cations, these account for approximately 80% of the observed variance. Third entrepreneurs' exit thresholds increase as the¯rm ages. Because we observe no¯rms exiting after their thirteenth and fourteenth months, we believe that the annual timing of lease renewals plays a large role in the increasing exit thresholds we estimate. Finally, entrepreneurs' observe pro¯t's persistent component without error. That is, entrepreneurial learning appears to be irrelevant for thē rms in our sample.
Conclusion
Our model of¯rm growth and survival with private entrepreneurial information has empirical content. In particular, the extent of entrepreneurial learning is econometrically identi¯ed, even though entrepreneurs' observations are hidden from the econometrician. Our maximum likelihood estimates indicate that entrepreneurs' observe pro¯t's persistent component without error, so the theoretical identi¯cation result has empirical relevance for our sample of new bars in Texas. The model we develop in this paper is structural| its unknown parameters either are primitive to the entrepreneur's decision problem or represent the entrepreneur's solution to it. Because we estimate the entrepreneur's decision rule directly, our procedure avoids the repeated solution of the decision maker's dynamic programming problem inherent to Rust's (1987) nested¯xed point algorithm. An additional advantage of estimating entrepreneurs' exit policies directly is that the procedure thereby accounts for the entrepreneur's superior understanding of her pro¯t maximization problem. The nonstationarity of the estimated exit thresholds illustrates this. Time-varying¯xed costs associated with annual lease renewal can manifest themselves in the estimated exit thresholds even if the econometrician fails to appreciate their importance before estimation.
One obvious omission from this paper's model is the in°uence of observable covariates on either the stochastic process for¯rm size or the entrepreneur's exit thresholds. Incorporating observable covariates is a straightforward extension of our analysis, but it may be of considerable relevance for the model's further application. A structural model of the growth and survival of new establishments owned by incumbent¯rms should incorporate observable characteristics of the parent¯rms as covariates. Examples of such characteristics in the TABC data set are¯rm size, geographic location, and use of a franchised identity. The e®ects of these variables on establishment growth and survival are of independent relevance for theories of contracts and¯rm formation. We plan to pursue these applications in future research. (1989) instrumental variable density-weighted average derivative estimates for single-index regression models of log sales on the logarithms of sales in the previous and¯rst months. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below each estimate. For each month, the estimation was conducted using the sample of¯rms that survived to that month. (ii) Age is measured in months and equals one for a¯rm¯ling its¯rst tax return. Notes: (i) This speci¯cation assumes that entrepreneurs face no signal extraction problem (´2 = 0), that the parameters determining the evolution of X t and W t after the¯rm's birth do not depend on the¯rm's age, and that the entrepreneur's exit threshold also does not vary with age.
(ii) The parameters ¹ and ¾ refer to ¹ t and ¾ t for t¸2. All other parameters without a time subscript are assumed to be invariant to the¯rm's age. (iii) The standard errors are calculated using an estimate of the information matrix based on the outer product of the scores. See the text for further details. Notes: (i) The reported statistics are calculated from a synthetic sample of 100; 000¯rm histories drawn from the estimated stationary speci¯cation. (ii) Age is measured in months and equals one for a new¯rm. (iii) The number of¯rms is measured in thousands. (iv) The exit rate is de¯ned as the number of¯rms operating in month t that do not operate in month t + 1 divided by the number of¯rms operating in month t. Notes: (i) This speci¯cation assumes that entrepreneurs face no signal extraction problem (´2 = 0) and that the evolution of X t and W t depends directly on age only because ¹ t may be a nontrivial function of t.
(ii) The parameter ¾ refers to ¾ t for t¸2. The other parameters without a time subscript are assumed to be invariant to the¯rm's age. (iii) The standard errors are calculated using an estimate of the information matrix based on the outer product of the scores. See the text for further details. Notes: (i) The reported statistics are calculated from a synthetic sample of 100; 000¯rm histories drawn from the estimated nonstationary speci¯cation. (ii) Age is measured in months and equals one for a new¯rm. (iii) The number of¯rms is measured in thousands.
(iv) The exit rate is de¯ned as the number of¯rms operating in month t that do not operate in month t + 1 divided by the number of¯rms operating in month t. 
